This paper considers the existence and properties of approximate Bertrand equilibria in a replicated industry. Price setting firms produce a homogeneous product with weakly convex costs. The main results are that: (a) Given E > 0, an E-equilibrium exists if the industry is large enough; (b) If the e is small enough, and the industry large enough, any E-equilibrium is approximately competitive. These results depend on how contingent demand is specified.
The closest results to this paper concern mixed-strategy equilibria in the BertrandEdgeworth framework. Shubik argued for the general Bertrand-Edgeworth case with mixed-strategies that as the number of firms tended to infinity, the expected price each firm sets will tend to the competitive price (1959, p. 123, 1955) . This result has been further investigated by Allen and Hellwig (1986) . Our result is rather different from this, since the Approximation Theorem can apply to small industries, although it is only in large industries that we can be confident that an e-equilibrium exists when e is small. The most important difference is that in this paper, "approximation" means that each firm sets its price close to the competitive price. With mixed-strategies only the expected price converges as the industry is replicated: Allen-Hellwig (1986) show that even in large industries firms will set prices that are not close to the competitive price with a positive probability. Our results also differ from the convergence of Cournot-Nash equilibria to the competitive equilibrium (see Novshek and Sonnenschein (1983) , Roberts (1980) inter alia). This literature considers the approximation of strict Cournot equilibria to competitive outcomes in general equilibrium economies. In the Cournot-Nash framework, of course, the Law of one price is imposed via the inverse demand correspondence.
THE GENERAL BERTRAND-EDGEWORTH FRAMEWORK
Without replication there is a set g of n firms producing a homogenous product. If the industry is replicated r times, each firm in g is replicated r times, the resulting set being denoted gr. Each firm i e gr is free to set its own price pi E [0, oo), the rn vector of prices being denoted p. Assumption Al. Costs. Each firm i E g has a total cost function ci: R+ -+ R+, which is strictly increasing, continuous and (weakly) convex in output xi. We do not impose an upper bound on xi because this would be inappropriate in the context of replication, and include oo as a possible value for xi (by convention ci(oo)= Lim ci as xi-+ oo). From Definition 1(a) note that si is a closed, convex valued, upperhemicontinuous correspondence, and si is monotonic (let q > p, then for any Sq ,si (q), s E si (p), sq ' sP) Hence si is multivalued only at a countable number of points, as depicted in Figure 1 . Given the properties of si, both o-i and Si are non-decreasing, continuous almost everywhere, whilst Si is right-continuous and left-upper-semicontinuous, and o-i left-continuous and right-lower-semi-continuous.3 Also 0-(p) ' S(q) whenever p > q. We make the assumption that firms have "lexicographic preferences" in the sense that they prefer to produce the largest of any outputs yielding the same profit. The assumption of continuity (c) can be relaxed: all that is required for the results in this paper is that industry demand is left-continuous. This paper includes little explicit analysis of demand, but it can be pictured as arising from a continuum of perfectly informed non-strategic consumers.
Assumptions 1-2 are together very general, and embrace the usual special cases dealt with in the literature. These include the standard Bertrand case where there is constant average costs for any positive output, and the Edgeworthian case of constant costs up to The competitive price and that p* > 0 > 0. It is important to note that from (1) and Definition 1(b):
In order to model price-setting behaviour, we need to know the demand facing firm j given the prices and quantities offered by other firms, the firm's contingent demand function. In general contingent demand depends on prices set and quantities offered by firms. However, since we assume firms have lexicographic preferences the quantity offered becomes a function of price-if firm j has set price pj, he will offer to sell up to Si(pi). Contingent demand for j in an r-replica industry can then be written as a function of prices only: Definition 2. Contingent Demand for Firm j, dj: Rm -> R,.
drj = drj(p).
We have analysed the possible specifications of contingent demand in some detail elsewhere (Dixon (1986) ). We shall employ the two standard specifications found in the literature. They both assume perfectly informed consumers who buy from the lowest priced firm that will sell to them. They differ over how the demand for a higher priced firm is determined when households have already purchased from a lower priced firm.
The first, First-come-first-served (FCFS), originates in Edgeworth (1897), and has been used more recently in Hellwig (1983, 1984) , Bekman (1965) , and Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). The most natural interpretation of this specification is that if there is excess demand for the output of a lower priced firm(s), then a subset of consumers are sold as much as they want, and hence have no residual demand for higher priced firms (we ignore any marginal customer who is only partly satisfied). The demand for higher-priced firms is given by the sum of the demand functions of the customers unsatisfied at lower prices. If consumers are heterogeneous, then the contingent demand under FCFS will be random, depending on who has been served first. We assume that demand is non-random, which can be justified by the assumption that household preferences are identical and homothetic (Dixon 1986 ).
The second specification, Compensated Contingent Demand (CCD), originates in Levitan and Shubik (1972) , and has been used by Brock and Scheinkman (1985) , Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) , Osborne and Pitchik (1985) . Under CCD the demand for the higher priced firms is the industry demand minus the total quantity sold by lower priced firms. This is what the contingent demand would be if there was only one household in the market, and any "income effects" from lower priced purchases where compensated. With many identical households it can be seen as arising from an "equal shares" rationing rule, which means that if there is excess demand for a firm(s), then each household receives an equal share of the available output. This can be generalized to heterogeneous households if there is a proportional-rationing scheme (as employed by Dubey (1982))-households receive a certain proportion of their demand, this being determined so as to equate purchases with supply at that price. Of course, proportional rationing is manipulable, since any household will receive more if it asks for more.7 Alternatively, households with unit demand functions and "reservation price rationing" (households with higher reservation prices are served first) give rise to CCD ).
With excess supply the exact method by which demand is allocated amongst firms setting the same price is not important for our results. The existing literature tends to make very specific assumptions about this. However, since households are indifferent between firms setting the same price, there is no obvious general reason for a specific rule (Dixon (1986)). We simply require the contingent demand for any firm j to lie between an upper bound V,j (based on the optimistic assumption that households will shop at j first), and a lower bound Wrj (based on the pessimistic assumption that households shop at j last). If no other firms are setting the same price as j, then Vr, = W,j. The only conditions that we impose on contingent demand functions drj are -that (a) contingent demand for j lies between Wrj and Vtj; (b) the contingent demands of firms setting the same price "add up" so that only one side of the market is rationed and there is voluntary trading;9 (c) demand for one firm is positive iff it is positive for all firms setting the same price. The first result is that for any ? >0, no matter how small, under CCD an e-equilibrium will exist if the economy is sufficiently large. 
Theorem 2 ((Existence
Since F is continuous and strictly decreasing when positive, we can choose r large enough so that the R.H.S. of (6) is small enough to ensure that qrj < 0 + A. Given that qrj tends to 0, the firms incentive to defect from 0 will also tend to 0. Either Sj (0) 
Hence as r -*0 and qrj -> 0, from (7) and (8):
SUp [i7r,,( q, 0 <)-ir,,(O8) ] ?-II
The intuition behind Theorem 2 is that as the industry is replicated, whilst the industry elasticity of demand remains constant, the firm's elasticity tends to-infinity around 0. Under CCD the slope of the contingent demand function for pj> 0 (when positive) becomes r times the slope of F, whilst the size of the firm remains constant. This is depicted in Figure 3 for the case where Sj (0) from an equal-shares or proportional-rationing scheme, the result is also intuitive. In a large industry starting from 0, when firm j raises his price the reduction in total supply at 0 is relatively small. Under equal shares or Proportional rationing, each individual household will only be affected slightly by this reduction, since it is spread over all households. By continuity, the additional amount any householder will be willing to pay to satisfy his frustrated demand will be very small. Hence the contingent demand facing firm j will be almost perfectly elastic.
Theorem 2 is very specific in the sense that the proof only deals with the competitive price. Theorem 3 embraces the set of all approximate equilibria: if ? is small enough, and the industry large enough, then in any ?-equilibrium in which all firms have positive output, all prices set will be close to the competitive price. To see why we need to impose the restriction that all firms have positive outputs, consider the standard Betrand model where all firms have the same constant costs-with no capacity limit. If there are more than two firms, then any price vector is a strict equilibrium so long as two firms set the competitive price. Since all firms earn zero profits whatever price is charged, even for ? = 0 there exist equilibria with firms setting prices arbitrarily far from 0 with zero output. Proof See appendix. II Taken together, the existence and approximation Theorems 2 and 3 are very general. They imply that in a "large" industry with small costs of decision and price adjustment, the trading process represented by Assumptions A1-4 will give rise to an outcome that is almost competitive. The approximation will consist both in the fact that the prices set are close to 0, and that industry output is close to its competitive level. Approximation Theorem 3 also implies that any price dispersion will be small. How large is "large" in this context is not theoretically determinable, depending on such factors as the elasticity of industry demand and the firm's cost functions. In the Betrand case of identical firms with constant returns to scale a strict equilibrium exists with two firms, and both firms set 0.
The In order to show that the Theorem holds in this case, we assume the contrary to derive a contradiction. The relevant contrary is that no matter how small E > 0, and how large r, there exists an E-equilibrium such that x >> 0 and pm ? 0 + A. We are then able to derive a contradiction, which happens to be that pm < 0+ A. 
Since F is continuous and strictly decreasing, we can choose r large enough so that Pm -0< A, the desired contradiction. Hence in both cases 1 and 2 we were able to choose E an r so that all prices set in an E-equilibrium with positive output were less than A above the competitive price. 
